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ABSTRACT
Thispaper is concerned with the risk-allocation effects of
alternative types of contracts used to set the price of a good to
be delivered in the future. Under a fixed price contract, the
price is specified in advance. Under a spot price contract, the
price is the price prevailing in the spot market at the time of
delivery.These contract forms are examined in the context of a
market in which sellers have uncertain production costs and buyers
have uncertain valuations. The paper derives and interprets a
general condition determining which contract form would be pre-
ferred when the seller and/or the buyer is risk averse. In
addition, an example is provided in which a spot price contract
with a floor price is superior both to a "pure" spot price con-






When a seller and a buyer enter into a contract for the
future delivery of some good, they can set the price to be paid
in several ways. For example, they can specify the price in
advance, which will be called a fixed price contract. Or they
can agree to the price prevailing in the spot market for the
good on the date of delivery, which will be referred to as a
spot price contract.1 This paper is concerned with the effects
of these two contract forms on the allocation of risk between
the parties when at least one of them is risk averse.-" (A
hybrid form -—aspot price contract with a floor price --also
will be discussed.)
Variations of these contract forms are widely used in
practice. For example, in a survey of members of the National
Association of Purchasing Management, it was found that 90%
used fixed price contracts, 65% used "price at delivery" con-
tracts (what I am calling spot price contracts), 50% used
renegotiated price contracts (price adjustments only in unusual
circumstances), 39% used "escalator clause" contracts (price
affected by increases or decreases in the costs of specific
inputs), and 20% used "cost plus" contracts.1' Contracting
practices in specific industries also illustrate the variety of
contract forms used. For example, contracts for the sale of
nuclear reactors have, at different times, been of the "turn—
key" (fixed price) form and of the cost—plus form.-/ Similarly,
contracts for the sale of natural gas, petroleum coke, and coal
have included fixed price contracts and several different kinds
of contracts with variable prices, including some withprice-.2—
floors and ceilings./
To begin to see how fixed price and spot price contracts
allocate risk, consider a simple example (the details of which
are discussed in section 4 below) .Supposethere are a large
number of sellers with identical, but uncertain, production
costs in an industry with a flat supply curve. Because of the
firms' cost uncertainty, the supply curve also is uncertain,
And because the supply curve is flat, the equilibrium price
in the spot market equals the realized value of the firms'
Costs (regardless of the demand curve). Suppose further that
there are many buyers (also firms) whose valuations are not
uncertain.
In this example, a spot price contract would insure a
seller against risk for the following reason. If that seller's
costs are high, so are all other sellers' costs, and so also
is the supply curve and the spot price. The increase in revenue
from the higher spot price exactly offsets the increase in pro-
duction costs. Thus, in this example, a spot price contract
provides perfect insurance for the seller against production
cost uncertainty. A fixed price contract would leave all of
the risk of production cost uncertainty on the seller.
However, a fixed price contract would insure a buyer
against risk in this example. This is because, assuming the
value of the good to the buyer is fixed, a fixed price contract
would guarantee the buyer a certain level of profits. A spot
price contract would cause the buyer's profits to be uncertain.—3—
Thus, in this example. a spot price contract insures the
seller and a fixed price contract insures the buyer. A spot
price contract will be chosen over a fixed price contract if and
only if the seller is more risk averse than the buyer.
The main contribution of this paper is to derive and
interpret the condition determining whether a spot price con-
tract or a fixed price contract is superior in a model in which
the following complications are added: First, it is assumed
that the industry supply curve may be rising (rather than flat),
and that the seller's uncertain production cost is positively,
but imperfectly, correlated with shifts in the industry supply
curve. Second, it is assumed that the buyer's valuation and the
industry demand curve are uncertain and that the buyer's valuation
is positively, but imperfectly, correlated with shifts in the
industry demand curve. Note that, if the supply curve is rising,
the equilibrium spot price will depend on fluctuations of both
the industry supply curve and the industry demand curve.
In this more general framework, a spot price contract will
still tend to insure the seller against production cost uncer-
tainty. The reason is similar to that discussed in the previous
example, although the upward slope of the industry supply curve
and the less than perfect correlation between the seller's costs
and shifts in the industry supply curve reduces the value of a
spot price contract as insurance against production cost uncer—
6/ tainty .—
However,as noted, the spot price also will fluctuate
because of shifts in the industry demand curve. A—4—
fixed price contract would insure the seller against these
demand—side uncertainties. Thus, in general, neither contract
can protect the seller against both supply-side and demand-side
risk.
The results regarding the buyer are the mirror image of
those regarding the seller. A spot price contract will tend
to insure the buyer against valuation uncertainty, while a
fixed price contract will insure the buyer against supply—side
uncertainties.
The preceding discussion shows that neither contract form
is best in terms of risk allocation in all circumstances.
Whether a spot price or a fixed price contract is preferred
depends on: the parties' relative aversion to risk;
the magnitudes of the supply-side and demand-side uncertainties;
the degree of correlation between the seller's costs and shifts
in the industry supply curve; the degree of correlation between
the buyer's valuation and shifts in the industry demand curve;
and the slopes of the supply and demand curves.
In the next section the basic framework is described,
including the general condition determining which contract form
is preferred. In section 3. this condition is interpreted
by examining some special cases. In section 4, an example is
presented in which a spot price contractwith a floor price
dominates both a "pure" spot price contract and afixed price
contract. And in section 5, some concluding remarks aremade./—5--
2.Basic Framework
This section presents the basic framework. First, the
spot market equilibrium is described. Then the seller's and
buyer's utility under spot price and fixed price contracts
is stated. Finally, the general condition determining whether
a spot price contract is preferred to a fixed price contract
is derived.
The industry supply curve in the spot market is assumed to






wherek3 >0and k4 >0are constants and S2 is a random
variable with mean zero and variance a2 ()The random variables
and F are assumed to be independent.2-"
Setting supply equal to demand and solving for the equi-
10/ librium spot price gives:—
(2.3) =+ Ar+
where
________ k2 ________ _______ =
+
where P is the price of the good, Q is industry output,
k1 >0and k20 are positive constants, and F is a random
variable with mean zero and variance a2 (F) ./Similarly,the




The corresponding expression for the equilibrium output is
omitted because it will not be used below. Industry equilibrium
is shown graphically in Figure 1.
Now consider a particular seller (hereafter "the Seller")
and a particular buyer ("the Buyer") who are contemplating
entering into a contract for the future exchange of oneunit
of the good, but who do not yet know their respective costs
and vaiuationsj!/ The Seller's cost of producing the good is
(2.5) C =c+y,
where c >0is a constant and 'yisa random variable with mean
zero and variance a2 (y)The random variable representing the
Seller's cost uncertainty is assumed to be positively corre-






where p(.) is the correlation coefficient, Cov(.) is the
covariance, and o(.) is the standard deviation of the respec-
tive arguments.
Similarly, the Buyer's value from having the good is
(2.7)V=v+w
where v >0is a constant and w is a random variable with mean
zero and variance o (w) .Therandom variable representing the
Buyer's valuation uncertainty is assumed to be positively corre—
lated with the random variable representing demand curve uncer-
tainty:















The Seller's cost and the Buyer's valuation are assumed to
12/ be independent.—
The parties are assumed to have the following mean—variance
utility functions:
(2.9) Seller: U =E(ir)—sVar(iT),
(2.10) Buyer:V =E(lr)-bVar(IT),
where iisthe relevant party's profit and s0 and b0 are
constants measuring the Seller's and Buyer's riskaversion.--"
The Seller's profit under a spot price contract is
(2.11) =P*—[c+y].
Using (2.3) ,(2.11)can be rewritten as:
(2.12) ii= (P—c)+(X1F
+ —
Thus,under a spot price contract, the Seller's expected pro-
fit is P—cand the variance of his profit is (X1F +
Similarly,the Seller's profit under a fixed price contract
with contract price P is:
(2.13) rr =P—[c+y].
This results in an expected profit of P -cand a variance of
profit of a2 (y)
The Buyer's profit under a spot price contract is
(2.14) It= v+—P,
or, using (2.3),
(2.15) if= (V — + —
AJJ
——9--
The resulting expected profit is v -and the resulting
variance of profits is a2(ai — - X22).Similarly, the Buyer's
profit under a fixed price contract with contract price P is:
(2.16) ii=v+w—p,
leading to an expected profit of v -Pand variance of profit
of a2(w). The results of the preceding cases are summarized
in Table 1.
It is shown in the Appendix that, with mean-variance
utility functions, the optimal contract form minimizes the
weighted sum of the parties' variances of profits, where the
weights are the parties' risk aversion coefficients.-/ Thus,
a spot price contract is preferred to a fixed price contract







The left-hand side of (2.17) can be interpreted as the parties'
disutility due to the bearing of risk under a spot price con-
tract, while the right—hand side is their comparable disutility
under a fixed price contract.Table 1
(a) Spot Price Contract
(b) Fixed Price Contract
Seller Buyer
Expected Profit P—c v—P
Variance of Profit o2(y) 2(w)
—10—
Expected Profitsand Variances of Profits—ii--
3. Interpretation
In order to understand better the condition determining
which contract form is preferred, this section will consider
several sp9cial cases. First, it will be assumed that only
one of the parties is risk averse, then that both re
risk averse.
3.1 Seller Risk Averse, Buyer Risk Neutral
In this case, condition (2.17) reduces to:
(3.1) a2 (A1F+ x2c2—y)< a2
It will be useful to examine this condition when either supply—
side uncertainty or demand—side uncertainty is absent.
Suppose first that the only source of uncertainty is with
respect to the demand curve; therefore, a2(F) =0and a2(i) =0.
Then (3.1) becomes
(3.2) a2(A2c2) <0,
implying that a fixed price contract is preferred to a spot
price contract. This makes sense intuitively. If the Seller's
production costs are fixed, then the Seller bears no risk if
his revenue is fixed, as it would be under a fixed price contract.
A spot price contract would make his revenue uncertain because
the spot price would vary with fluctuations in the demand curve.
Thus, a fixed pricecontractinsures the Seller against
side uncertainty.
Now suppose that the only sources of uncertainty are on
the supply side, both with respect to the Seller's production—12—
costs and with respect to the supply curve; therefore,
a2(c) =0.Now (3.1) becomes:
(3.3) a2(XF -')< a2(y)
After some manipulation, this can be rewritten as:
(3.4) p(F,y) > + k)
Clearly, this condition may or may not be satisfied. Therefore,
with respect to supply-side uncertainty, either a spot price
contract or a fixed price contract may be preferred.
To understand the circumstances in which each contract
form would be preferred, consider the terms in (3.4). Every-
thing else equal, the higher is p(F,y)——the (positive) corre-
lation between the Seller's production cost and the industry
supply curve-—the more likely a spot price contract is pre-
ferred to a fixed price contract, The reason, suggestedin
the introduction, is easy to see. Suppose, for example, that
the Seller's costs turn out to be high. Since i(F,i) > 0,
the industry supply curve, and hence the spot price, is likely
to be high as well. Therefore, a spot price contract canbe
viewed as a form of insurance for the Seller against production
cost uncertainty. High costs will tend to be associatedwith
high revenue, and viceversa)-/
This conclusion needs to be qualified for thefollowing
reason. As can be seen from (3.4),ii a(F)/c(y)——the ratio
of the standard deviation of the industry supplycurve to the
standard deviation of the Seller's costs--issufficiently high,
then a fixed price contract would be preferred to a spotprice--13—
contract regardless of the magnitude of p(F,y). Under these
circumstances, the implicit insurance provided by the spot
price contract is "too much of a good thing." For example,
if the Seller's costs rise, the spot price is likely to rise
by so much more that the Seller's profits become more variable
rather than less variable under a spot price contract. Thus,
in order for a spot price contract not to "overinsure" the
Seller in this sense, the variance of the industry supply curve
must not be too large relative to the variance of the Seller's
16/ costs .—
Onefinal factor needs to be taken into account. Every-
thing else equal, the extent to which shifts in the industry
supply curve lead to changes in the spot price depends on the
slopes of the industry supply and demand curves. This is
accounted for in (3.4) by the term k4/2(k2 +k4).For example,
the flatter the demand curve (i.e., the lower is k4), the smaller
the impact on the spot price of a shift in the supply curve.
Consequently, a spot price contract would be more likely to
be superior because the problem of "overinsuring" would be less
likely.
To summarize: A fixed price contract insures the Seller
against demand—side uncertainty, while a spot price contract
tends to insure the Seller against production—cost uncertainty
(although it might overinsure him). Therefore, when the Seller
is risk averse and the Buyer is risk neutral, which contract
form is preferred will depend on the relative importance of the
two sources of uncertainty (unless the spot price contract
overinsures the Seller against production cost uncertainty,
in which case a fixed price contract would be preferable)—14—
3.2 Buyer Risk Averse, Seller Risk Neutral






Note that (3.6) is identical to (3.1) with w--the Buyer's
valuation uncertainty——substituted for y—-the Seller's pro-
duction-cost uncertainty. Thus, the results of section 3.1
apply here in reverse.
If the only source of uncertainty is with respect to the
supply curve, (3.6) becomes
(3.7) 2(X1F)
<0,
implying that a fixed price contract is preferred to a spot
price contract. For reasons analogous to those discussed
earlier, a fixed price contract insures the Buyer against
supply-side uncertainty.
If the only sources of uncertainty are on the demand side,
(3.6) can be written as:
k
2
(3.8) p( ,w) >
2(k2 +k4)ThT
Theinterpretation of this condition is analogous to that of
(3.4) : A spot price contract can be viewed as a form of
ance for the Buyer against valuation uncertainty. However, if
it overinsures the Buyer, a fixed price contract may be pre-
ferred.—15—
3.3 Both Parties Risk Averse
In this section limiting values of the slope of the indus-
try supply curve will be considered when both parties are risk
averse.
Suppose first that the industry suoplv curve i flat;
i.e., k2 =0.Then A11 and A2 =0(see (2.4)), and the
condition determining whether a spot price contract is preferred
to a fixed price contract, (2.17), becomes:
(3.9) SG2(F —y)+ba2(w—F).<sc2(y)+ba2(w)
After some manipulation, (3.9) can be rewritten as
(3.10) b <s{2PFii----— i}.
Since the expression in braces may be positive or negative,
either a spot price or a fixed price contract may be preferred.
Condition (3.10) can be interpreted in terms of the results
in sections 3.1 and 3.2. First note that when the supply curve
is flat, only supply—side uncertainty matters since shifts in
the industry demand curve will not affect the spot price.
From the Seller's perspective,21 recall that a spot price
contract is preferred with respect to supply—side uncertainty
unless it "overjngures" the Seller; the condition for a spot
price contract to be preferred was given by (3.4), which,
when k2 =0,can be rewritten as:
(3.11) 2p(F,y) -1>0.
cf)
Note that the left-hand side of (3.11) is identical to the—16—
expression in braces in (3.10). Fromthe Buyer's perspective,
recall that a fixed price contract is preferredwith respect
to supply—side uncertainty because it fullyinsures the Buyer
against this source of risk. Therefore, (3.10) canbe given
the following interpretation. If the Seller prefersa fixed
price contract too——that is, if the expressionin braces is
negative—-then (3.10) clearly implies that afixed price con-
tract will be superior to a spot price contract. However,if
the Seller prefers a spot price contract—-that is,if the
expression in braces is positive-—then whether a spotprice or
a fixed price contract is superior depends onthe risk aversion
of the Seller relative to that of the Buyer and onthe extent
to which a spot price contract insures theSeller against
production cost uncertainty (as measured bythe magnitude of
the expression in braces in (3.10>).
Now suppose that the slope of the industry supply curve
approaches infinity. Then l approaches zero, A2approaches




This condition can be rewritten as:
(3.13). s<b{2P(cw) ¶____ — 4.
Theinterpretation of (3.13) is analogous to the interpretation
of (3.10). In the limit, as the slope of the industrysupply
curve approaches infinity, only demand—sideuncertaintymatters.'
With respect to this source of uncertainty, theSeller prefers—17—
a fixed price contract, whereas the Buyer prefers a spot price
contract unless it overinsures him. Therefore, if the Buyer
prefers a spot price contract, then which contract form is
superior depends on the strength of this preference and the
relative aversion to risk of the parties, whereas if the Buyer
prefers a fixed price contract, then that contract form will
be superior.
Other special cases easily can be worked out. Note, for
example, that the results when the slope of the industry demand
curve approaches (minus) infinity are identical to those when
the slope of the supply curve is zero (since X1 approaches
unity and A2 approaches zero). Similarly, when the slope of
the demand curve approaches zero, the results are identical
to those when the slope of the supply curve approaches infinity.—18—
4. Spot Price Contracts with FloorPrices: An Example
There are many other types of contracts that couldbe
considered by the parties in order to better allocate supply—
side and demand—side risks. One additional contractform
will be examined in this section——a spot price contractwith
a floor price. Under this contract, the Buyer paysthe Seller
the spot price or a prespecified floor price, whicheveris
greater. Since the floor price can bemade arbitrarily low,
this contract form can approximate a "pure" spot pricecontract.
Moreover, if the floor price is set sufficiently highand
the Buyer is made to pay the spot price or the floor price,
whichever is higher, less a positive constant, a spot price
contract with a floor price can also approximate afixed price
contract. Clearly, therefore, a spot price contractwith a
floor price cannot do worse than the other two contractforms.
This section presents an example in which it does better.
The example is a special case of the model described in
section 2.It is characterized by the following assumptions.
First, the industry supply curve is flat: k20. Second,
the random variable representing the Seller's production
cost uncertainty is identical to the random variable repre-
senting supply curve uncertainty: y =F.(This common random
variable will be referred to as y) Together, these two assump-
tions have a natural economic interpretation; they describe
a competitive industry in long-run equilibriumin which all of
the firms' costs are identical, but uncertain. Third, the
supply-side uncertainty is binary:—19—
-ra, with probability (1-r),
(4.1) y =
—ra+ a,with probability r,
where 0. <r<1and a >0are constants. Note that E(Y) =0
and
(4.2) a2(y) r(l—r)a2.
Given these three assumptions, the equilibrium spot price is
—ra, with probability (1-r),
(4.3)
P -ra+a,with probability r,
whereis a constant. Fourth, there is no demand—side uncer-
tainty.
Since the analysis of different contract forms in this
example parallels the analysis in the preceding two sections,
only a few details concerning the spot price contract with a
floor price will be discussed here. From (4.3), the low value
of the spot price is P —raand the high value is P -ra÷ a.
Therefore, let the floor price be P -ra+f,where 0 f a.
If f =0,the spot price contract with a floor price is equiva-
lent to a pure spot price contract and if f =a,it can be made
equivalent to a fixed price contract by having the Buyer pay
the floor price less a positive constant.(Since a reduction
of the contract price by a constant would not affect the vari-
ance of either party's profit, the possibility of such an
adjustment will be ignored in the remainder of this section.)
The Seller's profit under a spot price contract with floor
price f >0is, using (4.1) and (4.3):—20—
= — [C +y)
(4.4)
P— c+f, with probability (l—r),
P- c, with probability r.
The variance of the Seller's profit isr(1-r)f2 Similarly,
the Buyer's profit is:
v —P ÷ra —f,with probability (l-r),
(4.5) — V - P+ra-a,with probability r.
The variance of the Buyer's profit is r(l-r)(a-f)2.
As noted in section 2, the optimal contract minimizes
the weighted sum of the variances of profits, where the weights
are the parties' risk aversion coefficients. Thus,the optimal
floor price, P- ra+f*,can be determined by minimizing
(4.6) sr(l—r)f2 +br(1—r)(a—f
19/ over f. This leads to:—
(4 7) f* =r ab
[s+b
Inserting (4.7) into (4.6) gives the minimum of the weighted
sum of the variances of profits under a spot pricecontract
with a floor price:
(4.8) r(l—r)a2.
Under a pure spot price contract the weighted sum of the
variances of profits is
2
(4.9) [b}r(l—r)a—21—
while under a fixed price contract it is
(4.10) [s]r(1-r)a2.
Note that, as between a pure spot price contract and a fixed
price contract, the former is superior if and only if the Seller
is more risk averse than the Buyer.
A comparison of (4.8) through (4.10) shows that when both
parties are risk averse the spot price contract with the optimal
floor price is preferable both to a pure spot price contract
and to a fixed price contract since
(4.11)[]=[]b=[]
isless than both b and s when s >0and b >0.This result
can be exp1ained intuitively. In the example, a pure spot
price contract fully insures the Seller against production
cost uncertainty, leaving all of the risk on the Buyer. A
fixed price contract does just the opposite. When both parties
are risk averse, it is better to share the risk, which can be
accomplished by a spot price contract with a floor price.
There is a simple way in this example to measure the
advantage of a spot price contract with a floor price over the
other two contracts. Expressions (4.8) through (4.10) repre-
sent the disutility to the parties from the bearing of risk.
In each case, the term in brackets multiplies the variance of
the Seller's production cost (see (4.2)). Therefore, the
ratio of the risk—bearing costs under a spot price contract
with an optimal floor price to the risk-bearing costs under the—22—
other two contracts equals the ratioof sb/(s+b) to s or to b.
For example, suppose the Buyer and theSeller are equally risk
averse. Then the risk—bearing costsunder a spot price con-
tract with an optimal floor price are exactlyhalf of the risk-
bearing costs under either a pure spot pricecontract or a
fixed price contract. Or, for example, supposethe Buyer is
twice as risk averse as the Seller (i.e., b =2s).Then a
fixed price contract is superior to a pure spotprice contract,
but a spot price contract with an optimalfloor price reduces
risk-bearing costs by a third from what theywould be under a
fixed price contract.—23—
5.Concluding Remarks
Although many simplifying assumptions have been made in
this paper, the principal observations seem quite general: A
spot price contract tends to insure a seller against production
cost uncertainty and a buyer against valuation uncertainty
(although it may "overinsure" them). A fixed price contract
insures a seller against demand—side uncertainties and a buyer
against supply—side uncertainties. Thus, which contract form
will be preferred by the parties depends on their relative
aversion to risk and the magnitudes of the supply-side and
demand—side uncertainties.
The analysis in this paper can be used to help explain
contracting practices in different industries. Consider, for
example, the uranium industry, in which the sellers usually
are private firms and the buyers frequently are public utilities
(using the uranium to produce electricity). It would seem
reasonable to assume that the sellers are more risk averse
than the buyers with respect to fluctuations in the price of
uranium (since the price of uranium constitutes a small fraction
of the utilities' cost of producing electricity and they usually
can pass input price changes through to consumers)
The contracting practices in the uranium industry changed
during the early 1970's. Before then, fixed price contracts
were the norm. Afterwards, spot price contracts were used—24--
more frequently (often with a floor price). Assumingfor
simplicity that the buyers (public utilities) arerisk neutral,
this change would have to be explained by the risks borne by
the sellers. As noted earlier, sellers would prefer spot price
contracts with respect to production cost uncertainty (unless
such contracts overinsure them, which does not seem likelyin
this context) and fixed price contracts with respect to demand
uncertainty. About the time that contracting practices began
to change in the uranium industry, there was a significant
increase in production cost uncertainty due to the effectsof
environmental and mine safety regulations passed in the late
1960's and early 1970's. Thus, the change in contracting form
might be explained by these regulatory changes.—25—
Appendix
The following result will be demonstrated in this appendix:
Suppose the parties' utility functions are of the mean—variance
form, the sum of their expected profits is constant, and lump-
sum transfers can be made between them. Then one situation is
Pareto superior to another if and only if the weighted sum
of the partiest variances of profits, where the weights are the
respective coefficients in the parties' utility functions, is
lower under that situation.
The notation used will be adapted from the text. Let
represent the expected profit of party i (i =S,B)in
J
situation j (j =1,2) Then the assumption that the sum of the
parties' expected profits is constant becomes:
(A.l) IrS+ = +
1 1 2 2
Let the variance of profit of party i in situation
J
j, and represent a lump—sum transfer from S (the
Seller) Buyer) in situation j.
First it will be
variances of profits











shown that if the weighted sum of the
is lower under one situation, then that
Pareto superior to the other situation
urn transfers. Without loss of generality,
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Solving for k1from (A.3) and substituting the resulting expres-
sion into (A.4) gives:
— — — 2 2 2
(A.5) (11+ii— TTS ) — (SOS÷boB —SOS)÷k
From (A.1) ,theexpression in the first set of parentheses




(A.6) 2 1 1 2
>B-boB +k2,
2 2
where the inequality follows from (A.2). Hence, the Buyer's
utility is higher in situation 1.
Now it will be shown that if one situation is Pareto
superior to another, the weighted sum of the variancesof
profits is lower under that situation. Without lossof gener-
ality, suppose situation 1 is Pareto superior tosituation 2
and that the Seller's utility is strictly higher in situation 1:







1 1 2 2
— 2 —
(A.8) -ba B -boB
+k2.
1 1 2 2
Adding (A.7) and (A.8) gives:—27—
— 2 2 — — 2 2
(A.9) (+ ii) — so—bB
>S + 7TB ) SOS
—
boB
S1 B1 1 2 2 2 2
From (A. 1), the terms in parentheses cancel. Multiplying the
resulting expression by —l gives the desired result.—28—
Footnotes
*/ Stanford University and National Bureauof Economic
Research. This paper grew out of work I did in 1980for the
defendants in Westinghouse Electric Corporation V.RioAlgom
Limited, et al. (an antitrust suit by Westinghouse against
domestic and foreign uranium producers). The actual writing
of the paper, as well as the derivation of most of theresults
in the present version, occurred after the case wassettled in
1981. Work on the paper during the summer of 1982 was supported
by the Stanford Legal Resarch Fund,made possible by a bequest
from the Estate of Ira S. Lillick and by gifts fromRoderick E.
and Carla A. Hills and other friends of the Stanford Law
School. Helpful comments were provided by Lucian Bebchuk,
Jeffrey Perloff, Ivan P'ng, Michael Riordan,William Rogerson,
Steven Shavell, Edward Sherry, and participants inseminars
at Berkeley and Stanford.
1/ If the spot market is competitive, whichis consistent
with what will be assumed in section 2 below, then a spot price
contract is equivalent to transacting in the spotmarket.
Although there are reasons why the parties might preferto enter
into a contract rather than to transact in the spotmarket
(such as reduced transaction costs from dealingwith the same
person over time) ,thesereasons are not incorporated into the
model to be analyzed.
2/Both the seller and the buyer will be presumed to be
firms (although the assumption that the buyer is afirm is not
essential to the analysis) .Theassumption of risk aversion
in the case of firms has both theoretical and empiricalsupport.—29—
See, for example, Amihud and Lev (1981) and Marcus (1982).
3/ See Long and Varbie (1978). Although many of the
respondents obviously utilized more than one type of contract,
the use of multiple contract forms will not be considered in
this paper.
4/ See, for example, Burness, Montgomery, and Quirk
(1980)
5/ See, for example, Pierce (1982), Goldberg an
Erickson (1982), and Joskow (1985)
6/ There is also the possibility, discussed in section
3 below, that a spot price contract will "overinsure" the
seller, in which case a fixed price contract could be prefer-
able with respect to production cost uncertainty.
7/ Although, to my knowledge, the problem addressed in
this paper has not been studied previously, there is much work
on risk allocation that is related in one way or another. Of
general relevance are articles that consider risk allocation
issues in specific contractual settings--such as employment
contracts, defense procurement, and products liability.
Apparently, the first article of this sort was the study by
Cheung (1969) of employment contracts in agriculture.
There is also a large literature on the behavior of the
firm under uncertainty that is complementary to the problem
addressed here. Especially relevant are those papers which
consider what fraction of a firm's output it should sell
forward at a fixed price rather than in the spot market. An
early classic in this literature is McKinnon(1967) and more















choice of a single











Hoithausen (1979). Perloff (1981) applies this framework
to the excuse doctrine in contract law. This literature
not, however, consider the risk aversion of buyers.
Probably of most relevance to the present analysis is the
book by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) on commodity price stabil-
ization schemes and the paper by Shavell (1976) on deferred
compensation schemes. However, in the Newbery—StiglitZ frame-
work, if a firm's output were fixed, then a fixed price contract
(perfect commodity price stabilization) would eliminate all
analysis. The general results
t with those presented here,
specific contract forms and
in the spirit of the present
Stan (1982) analyzing profit
although they assume that
This is not the case in my
Shavell paper are consisten
h he does not consider the
structure that I do. Also
s the paper by Sebenius and
royalties, and fixed fees
the parties is risk netural.
Obviously, F must be such that P >0
s apply to the other random variables
This assumption may be reasonable i
t would be appropriate, fo
is due to fluctuations in
production cost uncertainty is due to regu-
the vagaries of the weather.
focus in this paper is on the contract
seller and a single buyer who treat the
nous, it is not necessary in deriving (2.3)
account of the behavior of all
in the market (although it is necessary to
choose to trade in the spot market)—31—
11/ It will be assumed that the realized values of the
uncertain costs and benefits are such that the parties will
want to complete the contract in the way originally contem-
plated by them--that is, by having the Seller produce the good
(as opposed to securing one unit in the spot market) and by
having the Buyer keep the good (as opposed to reselling itin
the spot market).
12/ The comment in note 9 above is applicable here too.
However, in a paper analyzing the effects of demand—side and
supply-side uncertainties on the output exchanged in a bilateral
trading situation, Weitzman (1981) has suggested why the
relevant random variables might be negatively correlated.
13/ Although mean-variance utility functions are widely
used because of their simplicity, their justification requires
some well—known assumptions. See, for example,Newbery and
Stiglitz (1981, Ch. 6)
14/ The conditions assumed in the Appendix include that
the sum of the parties' expected profits is constant and that
lump—sum transfers can be made between them. That the sum of
the parties' expected profits is constant across contract forms
is clear from Table 1. That lump—sum transfers can be made
between the parties follows from their ability to adjust the
contract price by a constant amount. Since such an adjustment
would not affect the variance of either party's profit, it is
not explicitly taken into account in the analysis.
15/ Note that this implicit insurance need not be perfect
in order for a spot price contract to be preferred.
16/ A possible response to this problem would be to make
the contract price only partly dependent on the spot price.—32—
I am indebted to Michael Riordan for suggesting this point.
17/I will use phrases like "from the Seller's perspective"
or "what the Seller would prefer" to refer to what the parties
would jointly choose if the Seller were risk averse and the
Buyer were risk neutral. Similar phrases will be used with
respect to the Buyer.
18/ Note that if shifts in the industry supply curve were
horizontal rather than vertical, then supply—side uncertainty
would matter even when the supply curve is perfectly inelastic.
j/Thesecond—order condition for a minimum is satisfied.—33—
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